BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM^{*}

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We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high-quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls for applicants, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates, we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates with no attachment to the system were equalized.

Key words: brain gain, government research programs, human capital, policy evaluation.

JEL Classification: O38, D78, C21, C78.

he key role of human capital in economic development (see Galor (2005) for a recent survey) makes the design of incentives crucial for institutions concerned with human capital improvement, namely, education and scientific research. This paper analyzes the design of the Ramón y Cajal Program, a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government. Currently, the Program shares features and objectives with other national and international programs, like the Juan de la Cierva and the EU Marie Curie fellowships. Initially, it was motivated by two pervasive problems: the shortage of budget resources

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and R&D personnel in Spanish centers, and the widespread practice of academic inbreeding. The shortage of funds undermined the development of a career path inside the system for junior researchers who lack an entry point into the R&D system. Also, both the lack of funds and the inbreeding practices impeded the access of new researchers to the research system.

The program was aimed at financing top and promising researchers, subject to rigorous and objective selection criteria, allowing them to join Spanish research centers and providing them with a well-defined career path¹. The selected candidates received a 5-year contract in a Spanish research center, as well as a somewhat formal priority in their choices of research in accordance with their relative position in the ranking. Afterwards, the research centers involved received a subsidy of 80 percent of the researcher's salary for the 5-year period, paid during each of the years in a decreasing scheme².

A key feature of the program in its first two calls was that, for a researcher to qualify, she needed an endorsement by a research center, that is, a formal commitment by the center that would hire the researcher if she was appointed by the program. This requirement was relaxed in the third call, so that endorsement became optional, although selected candidates with an endorsement retained priority in the centers that had endorsed them. From the fourth call on, endorsement was completely removed.

Shortly after the program was launched, there was a substantial stock of junior candidates within the research centers. Under the original design, research centers bore the costs of screening for suitable candidates through the endorsement process. After a few calls, though, the stock of candidates within the centers became exhausted and centers were forced to seek external candidates. This circumstance made the cost of searching for suitable candidates soar.

The change in the design removed the endorsement requirement and switched from a decentralized to a centralized procedure of candidate selection. After the policy change, candidates applied directly to the governmental agency, and the match between candidates and centers was done after the candidates eligible for contracts had been selected.

We are intrigued by the extent to which the original design of the program, jeopardizing the eligibility of candidates external to the system, affected the odds of such candidates. For this purpose, we exploit applications for data from the four first calls to empirically analyze the design change and the role of endorsement in candidates' opportunities. We posit that the key change in the program design, removing the endorsement requirement, equalized the opportunities for candidates with no attachment to the system.

⁽¹⁾ See Sanz Menéndez *et al.* (2002) and Sanz Menéndez (2003) for an account of the institutional background.

⁽²⁾ As a measure of the importance of the program, the number of grants offered were 800 in 2001, when the first call was launched, and 500, 700 and 300 in the subsequent calls, from 2002 to 2004, respectively. These grants jointly amounted to 365 million euros to be financed by the Government.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the Ramón y Cajal Program. In Section 2, we introduce the data and provide descriptive evidence related to the first four calls of the Program. Section 3 approaches a policy analysis based on data about applications and candidates, and Section 4 concludes.

1. THE RAMÓN Y CAJAL PROGRAM

The Program was established by the Spanish Government in the general context of a lack of R&D personnel in Spain and with Spanish Universities', hiring policies being called into question. The latter issue generated lively debate that was reflected in the international press and scientific journals. The two main issues were: (i) the lack of sufficient funding and (ii) the existence of social networks that, regardless of candidates' scientific merits, systematically hire one of their members [Navarro and Rivero (2001)]. Inbreeding has a long tradition in Spain. Its existence has been linked to poor scientific performance [see, for instance, Eisenberg and Wells (2000), Soler (2001)]. In addition, Spanish academia suffers from hostility towards researchers who have completed their training abroad [Ferrer (2000)].

To encourage the hiring of R&D personnel in research centers while circumventing the aforementioned distortions, the Spanish Government implemented the Ramón y Cajal Program. This program provided funding for 5-year contracts in research centers for the researchers selected. The selection procedure was centralized in an evaluation agency, Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva (ANEP). This evaluation agency, appointed by the Government, appraised all eligible applicants based on rigorous and objective evaluation criteria (mainly, scientific contributions), so that the better the researcher, the higher their priority to choose available positions should be. For this purpose, 24 evaluation committees of national and international experts, one for each research field, were constituted by the evaluation agency³. Overall, 341 experts took part in the evaluation in every call. If a contract was granted to a researcher, she could join any of the research departments that had endorsed her. The objective was two-fold: (i) to provide incentives to research centers to hire top researchers and (ii) to encourage top researchers to join Spanish research centers.

When the Program started, there were a large number of junior insiders –researchers already in the system– in temporary positions. Most of them had a low probability of obtaining a stable contract within the Spanish R&D system, mainly because of a lack of funding. To provide them with an entry point into the Spanish R&D system was among the political objectives of the program. In this context, the empirical evidence regarding the first call shown in Table 1 is clear. Among the applicants who obtained a contract in 2001, sixty percent were insiders; that is, researchers already in the system.

The original design of the Program, requiring each candidate to seek endorsement by at least one research center, was maintained for the first three calls. In the first three calls, each candidate was required to have a Ph.D. degree and a

⁽³⁾ A list of the 24 research areas is shown in the Appendix, Table A1.

Table 1: FINAL DISTRIBUTIO CONTRACTS IN THE	n of Ramón y Cajal 2 first call
Insiders	
All	60%
Outsiders	
Non-resident	14%
Resident	26%
All	40%

Note: Insiders (outsiders) are researchers who have (have not) a previous attachment with the center that endorses them.

Source: DGI, MCYT from Sanz Menéndez et al. (2002).

postgraduate stay of at least 18 months in a research center different to her Ph.D.'s. In 2003, a key modification altered the eligibility conditions, making endorsement optional, and endorsement was completely removed after 2004. However, while endorsement was removed, other requirements became more stringent. After 2004, each candidate was required to have earned her Ph.D. in the last 10 years⁴, and to have spent a postdoctoral stay of at least 24 months in a research center different to her Ph.D.'s.

The original design not only prioritizes insiders but also jeopardized the eligibility of external candidates. Later, when the stock of high-quality insider candidates declined⁵, the design was no longer useful, and it was then reformed. Furthermore, the tighter requirements imposed after 2004, undermined insiders' chances in the Program⁶, jeopardizing their eligibility and weakening the implicit contracts between research centers and their insiders.

2. Data and preliminary evidence

To assess the consequences of the design changes in the Ramón y Cajal Program, we exploit data about several calls of the Program provided by the Dirección General de Investigación of the Spanish Ministry of Education. Data on researcher applications and information provided by the 125 research institutions that participated in the program in four annual calls between 2001 and 2004 were

⁽⁴⁾ Maternity leave, military service or major illness were excluded from the time computation.

⁽⁵⁾ The number of insider applicants tended to decrease for several reasons. Some were excluded from the pool of potential applicants either because they were selected and obtained a contract in an earlier call, or because they lost eligibility in subsequent calls.

⁽⁶⁾ At the same time, the Juan de la Cierva program was developed for researchers about to present their doctoral dissertation or having done so in the last three years.

used. We excluded observations with missing values for individual characteristics, which represent less than one percent of all observations. Most participant institutions have more than one research department among the 24 research areas into which the applicants were divided.

Our data set is composed of 10,895 applications from 2001 to 2004, corresponding to 6,146 researchers. There are more applications than candidates because researchers can apply several times for two non-exclusive reasons: i) they do not achieve a contract in a given year and decide to apply again in a subsequent call, ii) they apply in a given year in two or more different research areas, thus accumulating different applications in that call.

The curricular information for the individuals at the time of the call was collected from the free software program *Publish or Perish* [Harzing (2007)] in combination with the *Journal of Citation Reports* (JCR)⁷. This software retrieves academic contributions by author using information from Google Scholar, which provides the title, the source, the year and the authors of the contribution. Whenever the contribution was published in a scientific journal, the journal information is also reported. We have also retrieved the impact factor from the JCR in order to weight the quality of each individual's contribution. We define the average impact factor of her JCR contributions as the ratio of the cumulated impact factor to the number of publications up to the year of the call. A researcher without contributions published in a journal listed in the JCR will trivially have a zero average impact factor.

The distribution of applications and candidates in the first four calls is shown in Table 2. The total number of applications and candidates exhibited a sharp decrease in 2004. This fact coincided with a sharp reduction in the number of contracts offered, and with the design change, which affected eligibility requirements. Unlike the subsequent calls, the first call shows the distinguishing feature that most candidates had a single application. We attribute this feature partly to the existence of a sizeable stock of insiders in the Spanish R&D system when the pro-

			bi i oon o	
	2001	2002	2003	2004
Applications	2,871	2,957	3,290	1,777
Candidates	2,789	2,506	2,550	1,342
% candidates with several applications	2.5	18.0	29.0	32.4
Grants	782	497	700	297
% of granted applications	27.2	16.8	21.3	16.7
% of granted candidates	28.0	19.8	27.5	22.1

Table 2: Applications and candidates by call in the first four calls

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by DGI, MCYT.

⁽⁷⁾ We merged data from applications and applicants' publication records according to the name and surname of the applicant, as well as her affiliation and research area.

gram was launched. The insiders in 2001 are most likely to apply only once, to the center to which they were attached. The same feature can be seen in Table 3, which shows the number of endorsements per candidate.

Table 3: End	ORSEMENTS BY	CANDIDATE IN E	ACH CALL	
Number of endorsements	2001 ^a	2002 ^a	2003 ^b	2004 ^c
0	_	_	286 (11%)	1,342
1	2,037 (73%)	1,671 (67%)	1,456 (57%)	_
2	523 (19%)	620 (25%)	594 (23%)	_
3 or more	229 (8%)	215 (8%)	214 (9%)	—
Total number of candidates	2,789	2,506	2,550	1,342

^a In 2001 and 2002 the endorsement was mandatory.

^b In 2003 the endorsement was optional.

^c In 2004 the endorsement was completely removed.

Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.

Table 4 shows the distribution of candidates in each call according to the number of previous calls in which they participated. Remarkably, a significant proportion of previously unsuccessful candidates applied again in later calls, as shown in the upper panel. After 2002, at least 43% of the applicants had applied in a previous call. More specifically, the proportion of new applicants in each call, i.e., those that had not applied before, is around 57% in 2002, 55% en 2003 and only 40% in 2004. We also report the number of successful candidates and the relative frequencies of successful candidates. For those candidates with previous applications, the probability of receiving a grant remains at moderately high values.

In Table 5, we have broken down the candidates in 2003 according to whether they had an endorsement or not. The percentage of successful candidates is higher for those with an endorsement, with a difference of 11 percentage points. In the lower panel, we have broken down the 2004 candidates, according to whether they had also applied in 2003 or not. If we concentrate on those who had also applied in 2003, we observe that the difference in the probability of success between those with and those without an endorsement is now negative.

3. POLICY ANALYSIS

The change in application requirements, with the endorsement completely removed in 2004, provides a natural experiment under which certain individuals are affected by the policy change. In particular, we can compare the outcomes in 2004 and 2003 for applicants with and without an endorsement. Our approach simply consists of a differences-in-differences (DID) estimator. The estimation

Number of previous calls				
		Тс	otal	
	2001	2002	2003	2004
0	2,789	1,434	1,390	533
1		1,072	612	405
2			548	233
3				171
		Granted of	candidates	
	2001	2002	2003	2004
0	782	297	370	120
1		200	158	91
2			172	59
3				27
		% of grante	d candidates	
	2001	2002	2003	2004
0	28.0	20.7	26.6	22.5
1		18.7	25.8	22.5
2			31.4	25.3
3			0	15.8
5				10.0

Table 4: CANDIDATES BY CALL AND BY NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CALLS

Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.

Table 5: Characteristics of applicants in 2003 and 2004

Applicants in 2003			
	Number	Granted	% Granted
All	2,550	700	27.5
With endorsement	2,264	650	28.7
w/o endorsement	286	50	17.5
Applicants in 2004			
	Number	Granted	% Granted
All	1,342	297	22.1
Did not apply in 2003	649	142	21.9
Also applied in 2003	693	155	22.4
With endorsement	625	137	21.9
w/o endorsement	68	18	26.5

Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.

sample is composed of all the applications in 2003 and 2004. While some individuals only applied in response to one of the two calls, others applied on both occasions (none of them had a contract in 2003).

We denote *i* for application and s for the year of the call (2003 or 2004). Let Dis be a binary variable that equals one if the application corresponds to an individual who applied *without endorsement* in 2003, and zero otherwise⁸. Also, let T_{is} be a binary variable that equals one for applications in 2004, after the policy change, and zero for applications in 2003. Our outcome variable, Y_{is} , is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the application is granted and 0 otherwise. The vector X_{is} contains some individual characteristics that will be detailed below. To analyze the effect of the change in the endorsement requirement, we consider the model for the probability of success, defined as being granted a contract:

$$\Pr(Y_{is} = 1 | T_{is}, D_{is}, X_{is}) = \beta_0 + \delta_0 T_{is} + \beta_1 D_{is} + \delta_1 T_{is} \times D_{is} + X'_{is} \gamma$$
[1]

The critical coefficient is δ_1 , which measures the average effect of the policy. It can be seen [Wooldridge (2002)] that δ_1 captures the difference between the average change in outcome between 2003 and 2004 for individuals affected by the policy rule and the corresponding change for the remaining individuals.

To estimate [1], we consider a linear probability model. In contrast with the logit or probit model, estimation is distribution-free. Its main limitation is that the predicted probabilities are not guaranteed to be in the [0,1] interval. However, our interest is not in the estimated probabilities, but in the average partial effects, for which the linear probability model provides a good approximation. For a discussion on this issue as well as some empirical applications in different contexts, see, for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009).

The validity of the simple specification in [1] requires that the policy change be the only source of mean variation. To control for unobserved individual differences not attributable to the policy change, we add different controls.

First, regarding the individual's curricular information, we use the average impact factor of her contributions published in JCR journals at the time of the call. To control for the heterogeneity of this quality measure across different research fields, we have considered its interaction with 7 research areas, in accordance with the classification used in *Publish or Perish*, instead of the 24 ANEP areas⁹.

Second, we also control for the quality of the center in which the candidate earned her Ph.D. The variable used is the scientific impact of the center, measured as the average number of citations to all the contributions published in JCR journals by its members. This information is available from the JCR.

Third, we have also considered some individual characteristics, such as gender and a second order polynomial in the years elapsed since the Ph.D. was obtained, and binary dummies for the place of residence of the candidate at the time of appli-

⁽⁸⁾ Therefore, D_i will take value one for (i) individuals applying in 2003 without endorsement; and (ii) individuals who only applied in 2004.

⁽⁹⁾ A list of these areas is shown in the Appendix, Table A2.

cation. For residence, we have considered the following groups of countries: Spain, EU-15, Europe (others), US-Canada, America (others), Other countries.

Finally, we have also considered differential effects across areas and by call. We have considered a set of binary variables for the 24 research areas defined by the ANEP, and interact the variables with a binary variable for 2004.

The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Since, as mentioned earlier, some applications correspond to the same applicant, we have used clustered standard errors. To assess the robustness of the results, we have considered two different specifications, the simplest one without additional control variables in column (i) and a richer specification with the aforementioned control variables in column (ii).

The estimates for the policy parameter are very similar in both columns, in magnitude and significance. Our estimates imply that individuals who applied without endorsement in 2003 experienced an increase of 10 percentage points in their success probability after the endorsement removal in 2004, with respect to the remaining individuals. The results in column (ii) are conditional on covariates controlling for curricular characteristics. Therefore, we can assert that individuals applying without endorsement in 2003 have, on average, a success probability that is 10 percentage points higher than the remaining individuals with similar curricular and individual characteristics.

Regarding the control variables in column (ii), we observe that the individual's academic quality, measured by the average impact of her contributions, has a positive effect, but it is only significant in a few areas (Biology, Chemistry and Engineering). Also, the quality of the center where the candidate earned her Ph.D. exhibits a significantly positive effect, seeming to be a factor acknowledged by the assessment committees. We also find that, other things being equal, male candidates exhibit a higher probability of being granted a contract.

In the 2004 call, two further requirements were introduced. First, the number of years elapsed after obtaining the Ph.D. was limited to a maximum of 10. Second, applicants should prove a postdoctoral stay of 24 months in a research center different to her Ph.D.'s. Our data do not allow us to control for the second requirement, but we can control for the first one. We also report, in columns (iii) and (iv), estimates for the subsample of applicants who achieved their Ph.D. in the last 10 years. The qualitative and quantitative results are similar to the full sample results.

For the sake of clarity, in Table 7, we have reported the components of the DID estimator corresponding to the estimates in Table 6. In the second row, we have measured the estimated average difference in the success probability in 2003 between those without and with endorsement, which is about -9 percentage points, even controlling for their academic performance and other control variables. When we consider the individual's success probability in 2004 (in the first row), however, there are no differences with respect to her previous endorsement status, which is exactly what we would expect, since endorsement was completely removed in the 2004 call. The DID effect (reported in Table 6 as the coefficient of the policy parameter) can be obtained as the difference between the first and the second row estimates. This DID effect is clearly positive and significant.

Thus, our results show that, in 2003, endorsement played a relevant role to explain the probability of being granted a contract, even after controlling for the

	Table 6: PR	OBABILITY OF	OBTAINING A	CONTRACT (L	JINEAR PROBA	BILITY MODEI		
		Full se	umple			Restricte	d sample ^a	
		i)	.i)	(ii)	ij	ii)	(j)	()
Research area ^b Residence zone ^c		0 0	X X	es es		و و	Ye Ye	S S
const	0.222^{\ddagger}	(0.007)	0.017	(0.042)	0.222^{\ddagger}	(0.008)	-0.023	(0.048)
T	-0.067	(0.014)	0.085	(0.076)	-0.064†	(0.014)	0.142^{*}	(0.083)
D	-0.087†	(0.019)	-0.100°	(0.012)	-0.081°	(0.021)	+060.0-	(0.021)
$T \times D$	0.109°	(0.025)	0.103^{\dagger}	(0.026)	0.102^{\dagger}	(0.027)	0.090	(0.027)
Avg. impact factor								
Biology			0.013^{\dagger}	(0.005)			0.011°	(0.005)
Business			-0.030	(0.047)			-0.029	(0.054)
Chemistry			0.017^{\ddagger}	(0.008)			0.019^{\ddagger}	(0.00)
Engineering			0.082^{\dagger}	(0.017)			0.077^{+}	(0.016)
Medicine			0.009	(0.006)			0.009	(0.007)
Physics			0.024	(0.017)			0.024	(0.018)
Social Sc.			0.006	(0.007)			0.005	(0.007)
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 † , ‡ and * denote 1, 5 and 10 percent significance. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

^a Only researchers who obtained the Ph.D. within the 10 years previous to the call.

^b The list of research areas in shown in the Appendix, Table A1.

^c Residence zones: Spain, EU-15, Europe (others), US-Canada, America (others), Other countries. Source: Own elaboration.

Table	6: Probabilit	Y OF OBTAINII	NG A CONTRAC	ct (Linear pi	ROBABILITY N	todel) (cont	tinuation)	
		Full se	umple			Restricte	ed sample ^a	
	(i)		ij	(1	ij	i)	(j)	()
PhD center quality Male			0.007^{\dagger} 0.036^{\sharp}	(0.002) (0.014)			0.006^{\dagger} 0.037^{\sharp}	(0.002) (0.015)
PhD tenure PhD tenure ²			0.019 [†] -0.0007 [†]	(0.004) (0.0002)			0.043† -0.003†	(0.011) (0.001)
No. observations	50	57	460	67	47	07	43(55
Wald Tests of Joint Sig	nificance (% p	-value)						
All variables	342.36	(0.00)	18.35	(0.00)	317.44	(00.0)	17.21	(0.00)
CV variables			6.12	(0.00)			5.67	(0.00)
PhD tenure			13.46	(00.0)			20.53	(0.00)
Research area			2.53	(0.00)			2.34	(0.00)
Residence zone			7.97	(0.00)			5.76	(0.00)
Interactions			1.69	(0.51)			1.72	(0.36)
Notes to Table 6:								
† , * and * denote 1, 5 and 10	percent significa	nce. Clustered s	tandard errors ii	n parentheses.				

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c Residence zones: Spain, EU-15, Europe (others), US-Canada, America (others), Other countries.

Source: Own elaboration.

^a Only researchers who obtained the Ph.D. within the 10 years previous to the call.

^b The list of research areas in shown in the Appendix, Table A1.

		Tał	ole 7: Dl	[D сомр	ONENTS			
		Full s	ample			Restricted	ł sample ^a	
	(i	i)	(i	i)	(i	ii)	(i	v)
	Without endors	vs. with ement	Without endors	vs. with sement	Without vs. with endorsement		Without endors	vs. with ement
Diff. in 2004	0.023	(0.017)	0.003	(0.018)	0.022	(0.017)	-0.0002	(0.018)
Diff. in 2003	-0.087^{\dagger}	(0.019)	-0.100^{+}	(0.012)	-0.081^{+}	(0.021)	-0.090†	(0.021)
DID	0.109 [†]	(0.025)	0.103 [†]	(0.026)	0.102^{\dagger}	(0.027)	0.090^{\dagger}	(0.027)

See Notes to Table 6.

Source: Own elaboration.

academic quality of the applicants. However, once the endorsement was removed in 2004, individuals' chances became independent of their previous endorsement status. As a consequence, we can conclude that, for similar curricular and individual characteristics, the old mechanism limited the opportunities for individuals with more difficulties to be endorsed.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The Ramón y Cajal Program was created to ameliorate the shortage of funds for research personnel and to improve the quality of the Spanish R&D system. For this purpose, the program provided funding to recruit quality researchers and to provide them with an entry point into the R&D system. When the program was started, there was a substantial stock of insider junior researchers within the centers, who lacked a career path because of the shortage of funds.

Apparently, this fact determined the original design of the program, by which only candidates with endorsement from at least one research center were eligible to receive a contract. This design led to the costs of selecting candidates being borne by the centers. These costs remained low as long as the stock of suitable insider candidates was large enough, but soared when centers ran out of suitable insider candidates and had to seek external candidates. At that time, the program was redesigned, making endorsement optional in the third call and removing it in the fourth. Also, the selection of candidates was centralized under the governmental agency. This meant, first, that research centers no longer bore the cost of screening candidates and, second, that any potential candidate could participate in the Program.

The new design, with the complete removal of the endorsement, is an improvement over the original one. Unlike the original design, the new design equalizes the chances of potential candidates, irrespective of their degree of attachment to research centers. The mechanism ensures that the overall quality of the applicants selected is improved by precluding the exclusion of any candidate. Also, the selection costs are internalized by the system. We analyzed the effect of the changes in the program design on the probability of earning a contract by exploiting application data for the 2003 and 2004 calls. The availability of data on researchers who applied in 2003, under the optional endorsement scheme, and applied again in 2004, when endorsement was removed, provided a natural experiment which enables us to assess whether endorsement status actually affected candidates' opportunities.

We find that, in 2003, endorsement status increased a candidate's chances, even after controlling for her academic quality. On the contrary, in 2004, when endorsement disappeared, the candidate's probability of success became independent of her earlier endorsement status. Thus, our empirical results reveal that the prioritization of insider candidates excluded potentially better candidates from the program. The full removal of the endorsement equalized the opportunities for researchers for whom the old mechanism proved detrimental.

Appendix

Table A1: RESEARCH AREAS (ANEP)
Physics and Space Sciences
Earth Sciences
Materials Science and Technology
Chemistry
Chemical Technology
Plant and Animal Biology. Ecology
Agriculture
Livestock and Fishery
Food Science and Technology
Molecular and Cell Biology and Genetics
Physiology and Pharmacology
Medicine
Mechanical, Ship and Aeronautical Engineering
Electrical and Electronic Eng. and Robotics
Civil Engineering and Architecture
Mathematics
Computer Sciences
Information and Communication Technologies
Economics
Law
Social Sciences
Psychology and Education Sciences
Philology and Philosophy
History and Art

Source: Own elaboration.

Table A2: RESEARCH AREAS (PUBLISH OR PERISH)

Biology, Life Sciences, Environmental Science Business, Administration, Finance, Economics Chemistry and Materials Science Engineering, Computer Science, Mathematics Medicine, Pharmacology, Veterinary Science Physics, Astronomy, Planetary Science Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities

Source: Own elaboration.



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RESUMEN

Analizamos el diseño del Programa Ramón y Cajal para la incorporación de investigadores de calidad a centros de investigación españoles. Se conjetura como hipótesis de partida que el programa cambió su diseño tras las primeras convocatorias en respuesta a las necesidades de los agentes involucrados. Utilizando una base de datos formada por las aplicaciones de los candidatos, encontramos que el nuevo diseño del programa generó cambios significativos en la probabilidad de conseguir un contrato. En particular, las oportunidades de los candidatos sin vinculación previa con el sistema se igualaron a las de aquéllos que sí la tenían.

Palabras clave: brain gain, programas de investigación públicos, capital humano, evaluación de políticas.

Clasificación JEL: O38, D78, C21, C78.